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Abstract
We focus on the effects of status loss on decisions
to participate in subsequent contests in online coding
platform. We advance the relevant literature in
several ways. First, by considering the effects of
status loss on resource expenditure, we depart from
the prior status literature, which has predominantly
looked at performance implications of the status loss.
Second, because of the voluntary nature of online
contests, we demonstrate how the effects of status
loss manifest when permanent exit or abstention is
possible. This aspect marks another departure from
situations common to the prior work, wherein work
demands persist regardless of status changes. Lastly,
recognizing that status changes may be endogenous
to one's past resource expenditure, we study
exogenous variation in status, exploiting a natural
experiment wherein status assignments were adjusted
overnight by the platform operator, in a manner
completely independent of individuals' prior
activities, resulting in sudden loss of status.

1. Introduction
Since Merton's seminal paper [1], management
scholars have extensively studied the effects of
status, which often manifests as an “ordering or
ranking in a social system” [2; p. 284]. Prior studies
collectively suggest that holding high status is
desirable because individuals who possess such status
can reap significantly more economic and social
benefits than those who do not [3]. However, an
individual's status is not permanent. Status may be
lost because of a variety of reasons. For example,
prior work has explored situations in which status
was lost because of a public scandal involving a highstatus individual [4], as well as when a person faces a
loss of favorable endorsement from a third-party
agency [5]. Regardless of why it occurs, the status
loss can significantly alter individuals' behavior [6].
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We build on this prior literature by studying the
behavioral implications of status loss, resulting from
the reordering of the status-defining categories at a
platform for online software coding contests. In so
doing, our work responds to recent calls for
examining how people behave after losing status [7;
p. 225].
Extant literature is mostly restricted to explaining
the effect of status loss on an individual’s or
organization’s performance in employment or the
market. With limited exception involving short
duration project teams involving students [8; p. 341],
prior work suggests that losing status leads to poorer
performance. [7] find that status loss results in
inconsistencies between status and the individual's
self-evaluation, resulting in ‘self-threat’. Similarly,
[6] find that the threat of status loss makes
individuals conform to norms, reducing their
creativity (p. 595). Studies also suggest, albeit
inconsistently, that the effect of status loss is uneven
across individuals. Some studies suggest that
individuals who bore higher status prior to the loss
exhibit a more severe drop in performance [7], while
others argue that the effect is more pronounced for
those who possess intermediate status [6]
Our study contributes to the prior body of work in
several ways. First, instead of focusing upon
performance changes deriving from status loss, we
consider the affected individual’s intermediate
behavioral response by observing their resource
expenditure. For an individual, spending scarce
resources is a far more deliberate action than
performance, for which there are several "potential
impediments outside the control of the individual" [9;
p.990]. Thus, from a behavioral standpoint, studying
the impact of status loss on resource expenditure is
substantially more meaningful, potentially yielding
more actionable managerial and policy implications.
Second, we relax an important boundary condition
pertaining to the effect of status loss. A common
consideration in most prior work on status loss is that
"work demands do not stop after losing status" [7; p.
255]. However, there are numerous settings in which
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this is not the case, with voluntary, unpaid work
being the most obvious example. Hence, our focus
upon online software coding contests, wherein
participation is entirely voluntary. In this setting,
individuals retain a near-complete autonomy in
deciding their course of action after a status loss. Our
study thus provides an empirical test of theoretical
predictions of status loss in a qualitatively different
context [10], wherein behavioral responses are not
constrained by the demands of gainful employment.
Lastly, exploiting a natural experiment, in the form of
an exogenous shock to an established status
hierarchy, we are able to tease out the effects of
status loss, isolating them from any endogenous
association between naturally occurring status loss
and
subsequent
resource
expenditure
and
performance. Thus, we are able to overcome the
persistent issue of endogeneity between the symbolic
effect of status and the actual underlying quality [11].
Our study context is CodeForces.com, an online
platform that hosts software programming contests.
The platform categorizes users into nine mutually
exclusive classes, based on metrics of individuals'
past contest performance. For instance, the lowest
group is referred to as Newbie and the highest as an
International Grandmaster. This categorization
creates tiers in the participant pool, demarcating
status. Typically, in online contest platforms,
individuals who are placed in higher categories,
attract greater prestige, admiration from fellow
developers, and even signal expertise to potential
recruiters. In October 2015, the platform restructured
the classification scheme, exogenously reassigning
some individuals to a lower category, independent of
any changes in their resource expenditure or
performance. We leverage this natural experiment to
identify the effects of status loss. Estimating a
Difference-In-Differences (DID) specification with
the contest and user fixed effects, we find that status
loss leads to an approximate 70% increase in a user’s
subsequent resource expenditure.
Our findings indicate that arbitrarily status loss
induces individuals to attempt to reacquire it. Thus,
while prior work shows that performance outcomes
may deteriorate after the status loss [6], we find
evidence to the contrary; that resource expenditure
spikes in response. As noted above, our contradictory
results are likely attributable to some combination of
our unique identification of the effects, and the
voluntary nature of resource expenditure in our study
context.

2. Background Literature

2.1 Status and Status Seeking
Status is defined as “one's relative standing in a
social hierarchy as determined by respect, deference
and social influence” [12; p. 281]. The concept has
attracted considerable research attention across a
number of settings, dealing with work in both
collective [13] and competitive tasks [2, 14]. Existing
work shows that individuals actively seek high status
because it provides "access to power and resources,
and therefore is pursued consciously in many
situations" [15; p. 105]. More importantly, studies
consistently show that behavior is driven by statusseeking, although there is some disagreement as to
whether attaining high status itself is the end goal
[15], or whether individuals strive for high status in
order to achieve other outcomes [16]. Some instances
of status-seeking behavior include product purchase
decisions [17] and participation in online
communities [18, 19].

2.2 Performance Implications of Status Loss
Although individuals seek status through
concerted efforts, the hazard of losing status is ever
present [4], and individuals are sensitive to this [20].
One can lose status in many ways, ranging from a
highly publicized scandal to demotion in a job.
Surprisingly, however, “the literature on status
processes has largely overlooked the phenomenon of
status loss” [21, p. 477]. In the emerging yet limited
body of work to date, the focus has typically been on
the performance implications of the status loss. [7]
argue that after a status loss, an individual may
experience self-threat and as a result, a breakdown of
the information processing necessary to execute their
tasks, leading to poorer performance (p. 226).
Similarly, [5] found that status loss among
investment brokers, stemming from the creation of
new analyst ranking categories in an established
status hierarchy, resulted in weaker response and
reduced attention from investors, leading to
performance declines. [6] argued that the threat of
status loss can force individuals to conform to norms,
lowering subsequent creative output.
While these early studies provide encouraging
results, they also suffer from certain limitations, not
the least of which relates to the use of market or labor
performance as the outcome of interest. Performance,
as conceptualized in the present work on status loss,
is not solely a product of a focal individual's
behavioral response to losing his or her status; rather,
it is a product of that behavioral response, as well as
the response of other stakeholders in the market, e.g.,
consumer perceptions. This argument is related to the
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ongoing debate about the view of performance as a
behavior rather than performance as an outcome.
While the advocates of the latter view suggest that
"performance is the result of what has been done",
proponents of the `performance as a behavior' stance
argue that "performance is in the doing” [9; p. 990].
Thus, to understand a focal actor's own response to
status loss, it is necessary to consider participationbased measures. To this end, we deviate from prior
work by examining the effect of status loss on the
individual's resource expenditure, rather than his or
her performance outcomes.

2.3 Behavioral Autonomy after Status Loss

empirical evidence on the performance outcomes of
status changes suggests, accounting for this
endogeneity can yield drastically different effect
estimates [22]. In the present work, we overcome this
challenge while examining the resource expenditure
response to status loss, by leveraging an exogenous
shock to the status hierarchy on the platform we
study. The shock was such that individuals lost status
suddenly and in a manner independent of their prior
performance or resource expenditure.

3. Methodology
3.1 Empirical Context

One of the key assumptions in the prior literature
is that “work demands don’t stop after status loss” [7;
p. 224]. For example, [21] examine the effect of
status loss among employees of a French
multinational. Clearly, the employees are required to
perform their duties regardless of their status. The
same can be said about studies involving members of
the British Parliament [4], and financial investment
analysts [5]. We argue that the presence of persistent
work demands limits the behavioral autonomy of
individuals, and thereby constraints their behavioral
response to status loss. That is, an employee is
constrained from simply ceasing their professional
duties following a status loss, out of a need to
maintain gainful employment. The degree to which
that constraint applies will depend on the degree to
which a given individual is locked into or dependent
upon their employment. By adopting an online
contest platform as our empirical setting, we relax
this constraint. On these types of platforms, resource
expenditure is generally voluntary. A user can simply
withdraw from the platform and stop participating if
they wish, with minimal cost. As such, the greater
behavioral autonomy that online contest platforms
afford leaves the door open to extreme behavioral
responses, ranging from complete withdrawal to
extremely high resource expenditure. As a result,
examining the behavioral effects of status loss in
such settings is potentially quite informative.

We study the impact of individuals' loss of status
on subsequent resource expenditure, in an online
contest setting: http://codeforces.com/. The platform
hosts regular time-bound competitions in which
participants can submit multiple solutions, with the
objective of improving their contest score against a
pre-defined software scoring algorithm. Based on
past contest performance, the platform rates
participants in a manner similar to the wellestablished Elo ratings used in chess and other
competitive sports
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elo_rating_system).
Conceptually, the notions of status and contest
are compatible because “central to both concepts are
hierarchical orders and their impact on human
behavior” [23, p.120]. Moreover, there is growing
interest in studying status in a variety of offline
competitive settings [14, 23]. Online contest
platforms have become quite common in recent years
[24] and hence provide a novel opportunity to study
status in a digital competitive space of great practical
relevance.
From a behavioral viewpoint, each participant on
the contest platform faces a two-staged, sequential
decision: whether to submit to a given contest and
how many submissions to make. Typically, a
participant makes multiple submissions. In the
present study, we model these outcomes.

2.4 Estimating Causal Effects of Status Loss

3.2 Status Hierarchy on CodeForces.com

Finally, we are also conscious of the endogeneity
issues that plague the status loss literature. Status is
often predicated on past performance and resource
expenditure. Thus, the status loss may very well
reflect on-going changes in a person's behavior,
rather than cause those changes. This reverse
causality creates obvious problems in identifying the
effect of status changes [11]. As some recent

The platform is highly transparent in its
assignment of participants to distinct status
categories. First, based on the participant’s current
rating, she is assigned to one of two divisions1. A
participant can submit solutions in contests hosted
1

As of May 2018, subsequent to our data collection period, a third
division has been introduced.
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either in their own division or in contests that are
made open to both divisions. Second, depending on
the participant’s rating, he or she is assigned to a
color-coded group, such that across the platform, the
participant's username is consistently displayed in the
associated color. Given that a participant is assigned
to a status category based on her past performance,
others readily associate her expertise and skill levels
with the color in which her username appears. Given
that the color scheme has been in existence since
November 2011, there has been ample opportunity
for these colors to become salient markers of the
participant’s status on CodeForces.com. Moreover,
anecdotal evidence in the form of discussion thread
postings in the Codeforces.com user forum suggests
that users do in fact ascribe status to these color
coding. As such, our conceptualization of status as
conveyed through distinct, prominent categories is
consistent with prior work on status loss [5].
We collected information on all contests,
submissions, participants and their time-varying
characteristics, including ratings and color status,
through February 2010 to January 2018 using the
platform's Web application programming interface.

3.2 Model Specification
To empirically examine the role of status changes
on resource expenditure, we began by analyzing the
association between naturally occurring changes in
participants’ color status, i.e., changes deriving from
historical performance, and participants’ subsequent
participation and resource expenditure. Of course,
this relationship is likely subject to endogeneity, as
described earlier. Most obviously, an individual’s
relative performance in a contest at time t may
decline, resulting in a status loss, because of fading
interest or engagement in the platform. That fading
interest also drives subsequent further declines in
resource expenditure and performance, and eventual
exit from the platform altogether. Intuitively, this
data-generating process would yield a negatively
biased estimate of the relationship between status loss
and subsequent participation and submission
volumes. As such, this initial, unidentified analysis is
performed primarily to serve as a point of
comparison, illustrating the importance of separately
identifying the effect of changes in status from that of
changes in performance.
We construct our panel data set based on a sliding
window of inclusion, such that a user-contest
observation was included only if an individual
submitted to at least one contest in the two weeks
preceding or following the observation. This was

done to ensure the user was actively deciding to
submit or not.
We estimated multiple regression specifications.
First, we considered the binary participation decision,
and thus estimated a Logistic regression and Linear
Probability Model (LPM), specifying the binary
indicator of submission to a given contest, t, by a
given individual, i, Submission (i, t), as a function of
recent status changes. For any given contest-user
pair, we respectively define StatusLoss(i, t) and
StatusGain(i, t) in that observation as an indicator of
whether the user lost or gained status as a result of his
or her most recent prior contest participation
Individual fixed effects and contest fixed effects
were included to account for the potential
confounding effects of time-invariant attributes
associated with users and contests. Equation (1)
reflects the LPM specification we estimate, which is
also analogous to the logistic regression model. Here,
i indexes users and t indexes contests. User fixed
effects are represented by δi, and contest fixed effects
by τt. Finally, ε(i, t) is our error term.
Submission(i, t) = δi + τt + StatusLoss(i, t) +
StatusGain(i, t) + ε(i, t)
Equation (1)
Subsequently, we replaced the dependent variable
with the count of submissions by individual i to
contest t. We then repeated the analysis using Poisson
regression incorporating individual and contest fixed
effects.

3.3 Recovering the Causal Effect of Status
Loss
As articulated earlier, status loss stemming from
the individual’s performance outcomes in a prior
contest is a function of resource expenditure, and thus
likely to be endogenous to individual’s subsequent
participation and resource expenditure in later
contests. This problem has been a persistent
empirical challenge in the status literature [11]. To
address this issue and to obtain the causal effect of
status loss on subsequent resource expenditure, we
exploit a natural experiment that resulted from the
platform’s decision to suddenly alter the existing
status categories. On the 1st of October, 2015, the
platform modified its color grouping system
overnight. Although there were some indications of
an impending change, the specific details and timing
were never revealed beforehand. Specifically, the
color status indicators were changed to incorporate a
new color group, leading to a change in the
composition of all groups situated above it in the
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hierarchy. Figure 3.3a provides the preexisting set of
categories while Figure 3.3b depicts the status
categories post the exogenous change. Compared to
Figure 1, one can notice the change in the Rating
Range for each category along with 2 new categories
added in Figure 2

Figure 1: Color categories before the
shock
(http://codeforces.com/blog/entry/3064

Figure 2: Color categories after the shock
(http://codeforces.com/blog/entry/20638)
Of the 14,060 active users at the time of the
natural experiment, approximately 7,900 lost their
status (moved to a lower-ranked color group), and
another approximately 2,000 were assigned to a
completely new, ostensibly higher-status color
(Cyan).
The
following
participant
postings/comments, taken from the platform
discussion forum shortly after the change was
implemented, suggest that individuals who
experienced a downward shift in their category
experienced a sense of loss
(http://codeforces.com/blog/entry/20638)
” Well, I’m feeling kinda empty :-(, but alright, have
to be purple again”

” I became yellow [Orange] in CF because of the
revolt of colors. Sad! :(”
” Participated in yesterday’s contest div2 and solved
problem A– today I am Cyan. Lol. dafaq!”
We focus on the 7,874 participants who saw their
status reduced. Although the subjects who received a
new color could be argued to have experienced an
exogenous increase in their status, this interpretation
is questionable, because status theory argues that
status is a product of norms and perceptions
constructed and reinforced over time [25]. Given the
overnight introduction of this new status tier, it
appears unlikely that it would deliver a clear increase
in status to affected participants.
Given that the change to the color-coding scheme
was sudden, and its adjustments were in no way
implemented as a function of participant performance
or rating dynamics, it constitutes a clean natural
experiment, which we leverage to evaluate the causal
impact of status loss on subsequent participation and
resource expenditure. Equation (2), which reflects
our natural experiment estimation, is similar to
Equation (1), except that the subscripts have been
modified to reflect a focus on a pair of contests for
each participant, i, namely the contest immediately
preceding the change, and that immediately following
the change. Moreover, the StatusLossExo(i, t) and
StatusGainExo(i, t) variables, in this case, reflect
indicators of whether participant i has experienced an
exogenous shift in his or her color tier, in the present
period, as a result of the platform change (this
amounts to the interaction term in our DiD
specification). Additionally, we replace the vector of
contest fixed effects with a simple post dummy.
Value of the dummy variable, Post is 1 in the all the
observations of the contest that took place
immediately after the shock. As a result, post dummy
correlates with contest features.
Submission(i, t) = δi + Postt + StatusLossExo(i, t) +
StatusGainExo(i, t) + ε(i, t)
Equation (2)
The primary coefficient of interest in this
regression is that associated with StatusLossExo, the
difference in differences estimate associated with
status loss. We include all users, noting that inactive
users will be unresponsive to the exogenous shock, as
they will not be aware of it. Accordingly, including
these individuals in our regression analyses will
merely make it more difficult for us to detect
statistically significant effects from the treatment. As
such, any resulting effects we identify can reasonably
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be viewed as conservative estimates. Once again,
after estimating the binary response models, we
repeat the process employing Poisson regression on
the count of submissions.

3.4 Data

Submit
Count
StatusLoss
StatusGain

621,361

2.89

0

211

4.75

594,878
594,878

0.29
0.17

0
0

1
1

0.45
0.38

Table 2: Descriptive statistics for natural
experiment

Data used in our (endogenous) panel regression
sample is comprised of all individual-contest
observations that preceded our natural experiment.
The estimation sample pertaining to our natural
experiment, in contrast, includes exactly two
observations per individual; one for the last contest
the individual could conceivably have submitted to
prior to the shock, and a second for the next contest
conducted immediately following the shock. We
adopt this approach because the effect of status loss
can be teased out most cleanly by observing the
immediate contests. If the time window around the
shock is expanded, the effects are likely to be
confounded by other unobserved determinants.
Moreover, we don’t observe any acute deviations
between the contests that occurred immediately
before and after the shock, and the rest of the contests
represented in the dataset. For instance, the contests
used in the DiD estimation have an average duration
of 7650 seconds while the average duration of all the
contests is 7579 seconds.
Descriptive statistics for our panel regression
sample are presented in Table 1, and those for our
natural experiment sample are presented in Table 2.
Considering the panel data set, in Table 1, we see that
the average individual-contest pair includes 2.89
submissions, but that the distribution is highly
skewed, with a maximum value of 211 submissions
to a single contest.
Moreover, even with our sliding window of
inclusion, based on individuals submitting to at least
one contest in the two weeks preceding or following
a contest, we still see that roughly 50% of the
individual-contest
observations
involve
zero
submissions. This observation helps justify our
consideration of both the binary submission decision
(participation), separate from the count of
submissions (effort). The status change dummies
indicate that both events are quite frequent, with
status loss preceding 29% of individual-contest
observations, and status gain preceding 17%.
Considering the Natural Experimental sample, in
Table 2, we see similar patterns.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for contestantcontest panel
N

Mean

Min

Max

Submit
Count
StatusLoss
Exo
StatusGain
Exo

N
28,120

Mean
0.89

Min
0

Max
47

SD
2.65

28,120

0.28

0

1

0.45

28,120

0.07

0

1

0.26

4. Results
The results of our binary regression models are
presented in Tables 3 (LPM) and 4 (Logit). Looking
first to the panel regression results in Table 3, we find
that loss of status as a result of the last active contest
participation is associated with a 1.3% increase in the
probability that an individual submits to a subsequent
contest. Considering our count model, in the 1st
column of Table 5, we see a similar result, indicating
an approximate 2.3% increase in the volume of
submissions to a subsequent contest, following a
status loss.
Recall, however, that these estimations are likely
to be downward biased because a typical status loss is
quite likely to be reflective of a pre-existing
downward trend in an individual’s engagement with
or interest in the platform. Accordingly, we might
expect that the effects are more positive. Indeed, this
is exactly what we observe when we shift focus to the
results of our natural experiment estimations. The
observed shift in the effects status loss underscores
the role of panel data results as a basis of comparison.
Returning to Table 4, we observe larger
coefficients in each case. Focusing on the logistic
regression result, which is arguably the more reliable
of the two, e.g., given that LPMs do not constrain the
model to yield predictions in the 0-1 range, we see an
order of magnitude increase in the estimated
coefficient on the loss of status. Similarly, in the
second column of Table 5, we see an estimated
positive effect of 0.532, showing a 20x increase in
the estimated coefficient, which translates to a nearly
70% increase in the rate of contest submission.
Table 3: Status loss effect on the decision to
submit (linear probability model)

SD

Page 4463

StatusLoss
StatusGain
User FE

Contest-Participant
Panel
0.013*** (0.001)
-0.008*** (0.002)
Yes

Natural
Experiment
0.016+ (0.008)
0.003 (0.011)
Yes

Contest FE
N
Adj. R2

Yes
592822
0.148

Yes
28120
0.273

Cluster robust standard errors reported in the parentheses;
OLS estimator with two-way fixed effects is used;
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 4: Status loss effect on the decision to
submit (logit)

StatusLoss
StatusGain
User FE

ContestParticipant Panel
0.066*** (0.008)
-0.042*** (0.009)
Yes

Natural
Experiment
0.646*** (0.098)
0.096 (0.122)
Yes

Contest FE
N

Yes
594878

Yes
5348

Cluster robust standard errors reported in the parentheses;
Logit estimator with two-way fixed effects is used;
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 5: Status loss effect on submission
count

StatusLoss
StatusGain
User FE

Contest-Participant
Panel
0.023*** (0.005)
-0.028*** (0.005)
Yes

Natural
Experiment
0.532*** (0.071)
-0.053 (0.089)
Yes

Contest FE
N

Yes
569348

Yes
6810

Cluster robust standard errors reported in the parentheses;
Poisson estimator with two-way fixed effects is used; + p <
0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

5. Conclusion
We have presented a novel analysis of status loss
effects on individuals’ subsequent resource
expenditure in the context of an online software
coding contest platform, Codeforces.com. Our work
departs from the small body of prior work on status
loss in three ways. First, we consider a context
involving voluntary, unpaid work, where individuals’
responses to status loss are not constrained by
persistent work demands. That is, individuals have
the autonomy to reduce their engagement or exit the
market entirely. Second, we focus on the immediate
impact upon affected individuals’ resource

expenditure, rather than changes in performance,
noting that performance is a downstream outcome
that results from both affected individuals’ resource
expenditure, as well as perceptions of other
stakeholders in the market, e.g., consumers, which
may also be influenced by the focal actor’s status
loss. Third, we attend closely to the issue of causal
identification, exploiting a natural experiment in
which the platform operator adjusted status markers
independent of any changes in individuals’ resource
expenditure or performance.
We provide evidence that status loss results in
large increases in affected individuals’ resource
expenditure. In short, when individuals experience
exogenous status loss, they respond vigorously by
attempting to reacquire that status.
Our findings suggest that the mechanisms behind
prior findings of performance declines following a
status loss are either context-dependent or a result of
negative market perceptions dominating any resource
expenditure increase on the part of affected workers.
These findings have important implications for
practice and policy, as they suggest that the optimal
approach to managing worker effort in the face of
status loss should focus not on inducing effort; rather,
they should focus on managing perceptions.
For example, in our setting, market perceptions
primarily play a role in career search for affected
contestants. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some
workers benefit from improved career prospects as a
result of their success in these contests. Status shifts
that ignore this may do unnecessary harm to
contestants if the message to employers is not well
managed.
More generally, our findings contribute to the
literature on the status loss. In large part, this
contribution arises by raising new questions about the
nature and mechanisms of status loss effects on
worker performance. Our findings suggest that
additional work is needed to tease apart resource
expenditure from performance outcomes, as a result
of the status loss, and to understand the moderating
influence of incentive structures, be they job search,
financial compensation or intrinsic motivators.
This study has several possible extensions, which
may aid in further uncovering the underlying statusbased mechanisms. First, one may assess whether the
observed effects of status loss is predicated on the
solver’s status before the shock. Extant work indeed
suggests that those with higher prior status respond to
status loss more strongly than those with lower prior
status [7] Second, future studies can examine whether
the exogenous changes in the status also affects the
quality of the output that users generate. Lastly, one
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can also examine the length for which the effect of
status loss lasts.
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